鑒于中國對意大利足球在上世紀八十，九十年代就建立了深厚的情感基礎，并始終對意大利足球抱持積極態度，中國投資者對這些俱樂部表現出興趣并不讓人感到意外。

不過，這些推測都誕生于中國投資者和企業家們對歐洲俱樂部的一系列收購之后。其中最值得關注的收購也許是華人文化收購曼城母公司13%的股份，以及萬達公司收購馬德里競技20%的股份。此外，也包括對西班牙人和荷蘭海牙ADO俱樂部的完全收購等。AC米蘭或國際米蘭確有可能成為下一個目標。

由于中國正在努力實現其體育行業的發展愿景及足球目標，我們在未來很有可能看到更多針對歐洲俱樂部的收購。原因顯而易見：在一個層面上，歐洲足球俱樂部可以是個產生收益的投資機會。在另一層面上，收購一家俱樂部有助于提升業務組合的多樣性，尤其非常適合作為中國大娛樂產業中的一環。

▲ 來自中國的資本已經和英超曼城俱樂部有了緊密聯系。

收購一家俱樂部同樣會成為汲取商業理念，提升競爭力以及獲取知識的良好來源。如果中國的俱樂部希望學習如何考察球員的天分，建設自己的市場部門，了解贊助合同如何運作，吸引球迷并建設令人興奮的體育場館等基礎設施，那么投資一家歐洲俱樂部并從中汲取新知識就顯得是順理成章的事情。

但收購一家歐洲俱樂部并非易事，它需要專業的商業知識，歐洲各地的俱樂部所有權模式不盡相同，受到各國不同的俱樂部所有權規則管理。此外，投資者還需知道國際足聯，歐足聯或歐盟對于俱樂部所有權問題沒有明確的方針。

以英格蘭為例，在過去十年間，國外投資者收購了包括曼聯，曼城，切爾西，阿森納、利物浦在內的多家俱樂部，俱樂部價值也大幅提升。而大多數英格蘭俱樂部都以私人有限公司形式構成，即俱樂部股份可以被一小群人買入或出售。

這意味著英格蘭俱樂部相對更容易被收購，需要的只是合理的報價并且說服現在的俱樂部擁有者出售其股份。理論上，如果一個收購者未能通過資格考核，其對英格蘭俱樂部的收購將會被終止或延期。這一考核保證了俱樂部未來的擁有者確實擁有足夠的財務資源來購買并運營一家足球俱樂部。

對于資格考核的批評一直存在，尤其是對楊家誠收購伯明翰一事。楊通過了考核，后來卻因洗錢犯罪被香港警方逮捕。資格考核的說服力因此受到公開質疑。

相比英格蘭，德國的規定要更加復雜和嚴格。實際上，由于德國足球俱樂部所有權規則的限制，中國投資者目前還不能完全收購德國俱樂部。特別是50+1政策，規定俱樂部的大部分股份必須留在球迷手中。

德國因其注重球迷利益和民主權力的做法而被樹立為足球管理的良好典范。不過，隨著一些歐洲國家的俱樂部在海外投資者資金的支持下大步向前邁進，德國國內已經開始質疑這樣的所有權模式是否明智。規則上的變化并非近在眼前，但仍值得投資者們保持關注。

西班牙足球的運作系統看起來像是英格蘭和德國俱樂部所有權模式的混合：一部分俱樂部是私有的，因此近期有卡塔爾和中國投資者分別收購馬拉加與西班牙人兩家俱樂部。其他俱樂部，如皇家馬德里和巴塞羅那，則采取會員制，即俱樂部所有權屬于每年單獨繳納會員年費的球迷們。

皇馬和巴薩的情況短期內可能不會有變化，因為兩家俱樂部都將“球迷擁有俱樂部”這一條寫進了俱樂部章程。任何章程的變化都需要球迷進行投票，何況這可能會帶來各種各樣的法律問題。此外，以巴塞羅那為例，俱樂部常被當作民主和良好管理的典范，我們在未來一段時間里看到紅藍之師所有權變更的機會微乎其微。

投資者還要謹記的是，西班牙俱樂部的所有權與政治密切相關，并常與西班牙地方主義及動蕩的歷史相聯系。因此，了解西班牙的社會文化情況，對任何希望購買西班牙俱樂部股份的投資者來說都是必要的。

▲ 中國萬達集團入股西甲球會馬德里競技。

意大利的情況與英格蘭相似，不同于德國與西班牙。球迷擁有俱樂部所有權在意大利并不常見。相反，意大利足球俱樂部的所有權歷來為具有工業背景的家族所掌控——例如，國際米蘭的莫拉蒂和尤文圖斯的阿涅利。

這樣的所有權模式反映了俱樂部、地方社區及俱樂部擁有者商業利益之間的密切關系。不過，即便是這樣，情況也正有所變化。意大利足球在幾個方面都很掙扎：過度政治干預的傳統，整體投資的不足以及意甲落后于英格蘭及西班牙聯賽的事實。

因此，我們近期看到了新一輪投資者進入意大利聯賽的浪潮，如博洛尼亞、烏迪內斯和羅馬的俱樂部等。后者由于目前正由美國企業家擁有并運營俱樂部而顯得尤其重要。

在意大利掌控一家俱樂部并不困難，但目前仍有當地政府掌控球隊體育場的情況。在這些地區，體育場館帶來的利潤收益由當地政府說了算，而非俱樂部。從經濟角度看，這對于俱樂部所有者而言是極大的約束，因此我們看到很多新的俱樂部所有者開始建造屬于自己的場館，或與當地政府就場館控制權做著不懈斗爭。尤文圖斯是一個典型例子，羅馬也是如此。

我們可以看到，在歐洲其他地方，足球已有新的所有權模式并對外國投資者們保持著開放。在法國，卡塔爾財團（卡塔爾體育投資基金——國家主權財富基金的一部分）收購了巴黎圣日耳曼。汽車制造商標致公司去年將索肖足球俱樂部轉讓給了中國投資者，摩納哥足球俱樂部也在幾年前被俄羅斯大亨收購。法國對俱樂部尋找新老板持開放態度，這對于投資者而言也是新的目標。

對比目前中國投資者已經進入的市場，歐洲可供投資的國家其實有很多，這其中包括荷蘭和捷克，中國人已對荷蘭的海牙ADO足球俱樂部和捷克的布拉格斯拉夫人足球俱樂部進行了收購。不過，無論是在哪個國家，對于未來俱樂部的所有者們都是一樣的，你必須理解你想投資的這個國家的法律、政治、社會和文化環境。

?英文原文：

In recent months there has been speculationthat both of Milan’s Serie A clubs – AC and Internazionale – have been subjectto interest from Chinese investors. It remains unclear whether the investorswant to buy the clubs outright or are seeking to take a stake in the clubs.

Chinese interest in such clubs isinevitable given the country’s positive predisposition towards Italianfootball, a relationship that was strongly forged back in the 1980s. Yet thespeculation comes in the wake of a spate of European club acquisitions byChinese investors and entrepreneurs.

Perhaps the most notable acquisitions havebeen the 13% stake in Manchester City, taken by CMC; and the 20% shareholdingin Atletico Madrid secured by the Wanda Corporation. But there have beenseveral other, outright club purchases including at Espanyol and Den Haag. ACor Internazionale could be next.

As China pursues its sport industry visionand its football goals, it is highly likely that we will see more European clubacquisitions. There are obvious reasons for this: at one level, Europeanfootball clubs can be revenue generating investment opportunities. At anotherlevel, buying a club contributes to a diversified business portfolio, somethingthat aligns with the conglomeration of some Chinese entertainment businesses.

Buying a club is also a good source ofbusiness intelligence, competence development and learning. If Chinese clubsare to learn how to successfully identify playing talent, build their marketingdepartments, understand how sponsorship deals work, engage fans and createexciting stadium facilities, then transferring knowledge from a European cluban investor owns makes a lot of sense.

But acquiring a European club is notstraightforward, it requires specific market intelligence as there are variousclub ownership models in place across Europe. These in turn are governed by differentownership rules in each country. Furthermore, it is worthwhile for prospectiveinvestors to note that no ownership guidelines are provided by FIFA, UEFA orthe EU.

Consider England as an example; the valueof clubs has risen dramatically over the last decade or so, as foreigninvestors have acquired clubs including Manchester United and City, Chelsea,Arsenal and Liverpool. Most clubs in England are constituted as private limitedcompanies, meaning football club shares can be bought and sold among smallgroups of people.

This means English clubs are relativelyeasy to acquire, providing the price is right and one can persuade the existingowners to sell. In theory, acquisition of an English club can be stopped ordelayed if a prospective owner fails a fit and proper person test. This testensures that a prospective owner actually does have the financial resourcesneeded to buy and run a football club.

There has been some criticism of the fitand proper person test, notably in the light of Carson Yeung’s purchase ofBirmingham City. While he passed the test, he was subsequently jailed in HongKong for money laundering offences. The stringency of the fit and proper persontest therefore remains open to question.

In Germany, the situation is rather morecomplex and restrictive than in England. Indeed, prospective Chinese investorsare currently unable to acquire outright control of a club because of Germanfootball’s ownership rules. Specifically, the 50+1 rule dictates that themajority of a club’s shares must remain in the hands of fans (hence, 50% + 1share).

Germany is therefore often held-up as anexample of good governance principles in football for the way in which itupholds fan interests and democracy. However, some in Germany are beginning toquestion the wisdom of such an ownership model as clubs in other Europeancountries forge ahead on the back of funds provided by overseas investors. Achange in regulations isn’t imminent, but it is worthwhile that investorsmonitor the situation.

Spanish football operates a system that isseemingly a hybrid of the English and German club ownership models: some clubsare privately owned, hence the recent purchases of Malaga and Espanyol byQatari and Chinese owners respectively. Other clubs such as Real Madrid andBarcelona are membership organisations. That is, they ate owned by fans whoeffectively take an ownership share in them by individually paying an annualmembership fee.

The situation at Real and Barca is unlikelyto change any time soon as it is written into each club’s constitution thatfans own the clubs. Any change in these constitutions would need fans to votein favour of it, which would be likely to create all manner of legal problems.Furthermore, in Barca’s case, the club is often held-up as being a model of fandemocracy and good governance. It is extremely unlikely that we will ever see achange in ownership at the blau grana.

It is worth keeping in mind too that clubownership in Spain is highly a highly politicised phenomenon, and is oftenlinked to the complexities of Spain regionalism and the country’s sometimesfractious history. Understanding the country’s socio-cultural landscape wouldthus seem to be an imperative for anyone considering purchase of a stake in aSpanish club.

In Italy, the situation is not dissimilarto that in England; unlike in Germany and Spain, fan ownership of clubs isuncommon. Instead, Italian football club ownership has historically been dominatedby industrial family ownership - for example, the Moratti’s at Internazionaleand the Agnelli’s at Juventus.

This pattern and model of ownership hasreflected the close relationship between clubs, local communities and thebusiness interests of club owners. However, the situation is now changing; Italianfootball has been struggling on several fronts notably in relation to its overlypolitical nature, a general lack of investment, and Serie A’s failure to keeppace with leagues in England and Spain.

Hence, we have recently seen a new wave of ownersentering the Italian game, at clubs such as Bologna, Udinese and Roma. Thelatter is particularly significant as American entrepreneurs now own and arerunning the club. While the controls on club ownership in Italian are notonerous, one issue is that local government often owns the stadiums in whichteams play.

In cases where this happens, localgovernment therefore own the revenue streams generated by the stadiums, not theclub. This is commercially restrictive for owners, hence we have seen the waveof new club owners seeking either to build their own stadiums, or to wrestlecontrol of stadiums from local government. Juventus is one example of this,Roma is another.

Elsewhere in Europe, we have seen footballopening-up to new ownership models and to foreign investors. In France, theQataris (through Qatar Sports Investment, part of the country’s sovereignwealth fund) purchased Paris Saint Germain. Just as significantly, Sochaux wassold last year by car manufacturers Peugeot to Chinese investors, while Monacowas bought several years ago by a Russian oligarch. It seems as though Francehas opened-up to the need for new club owners, and the country is thus apossible destination for inward football investment.

There are obviously more countries inEurope, into which Chinese investors have already moved. This includes Hollandand the Czech Republic, where Chinese citizens has bought Den Haag and SlaviaPrague respectively. Whichever the country might be however, the generallessons for prospective owners are the same: understand the legal, political,social and cultural environment into which you are planning to invest. 

作者簡介：西蒙·查德威克，任教于英國索爾福德大學，被聘為“92班“教授，教授“體育企業”，“體育戰略”等課程。同時他還擔任2022卡塔爾世界杯研究項目主任。與西蒙·查德威克教授合作過的世界頂級體育組織包括巴塞羅那足球俱樂部、歐足聯、德國足球甲級聯賽、阿迪達斯、米其林、國際網球聯合會、德勤和Repucom。

Simon Chadwick is 'Class of 92' Professor of Sports Enterprise at Salford University Manchester and Director of Research for the 2022 Qatar World Cup. He has worked with many of the world's leading sports organisations including FC Barcelona, UEFA, the Bundesliga, Adidas, Michelin Motorsport, the International Tennis Federation, Deloitte and Repucom.

·END·

聲明：文中觀點僅代表作者本人觀點，不代表懶熊體育。